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Abstract—One-time login process in conventional authentica-
tion systems does not guarantee that the identified user is the
actual user throughout the session. However, it is necessary to
re-verify the user identity periodically throughout a login session
without reducing the user convenience. Continuous authentication
can address this issue. However, existing methods are either not
reliable or not usable. In this paper, we introduce a usable and re-
liable method called Wearable-Assisted Continuous Authentication
(WACA). WACA relies on the sensor-based keystroke dynamics,
where the authentication data is acquired through the built-
in sensors of a wearable (e.g., smartwatch) while the user is
typing. We implemented the WACA framework and evaluated
its performance on real devices with real users. The empirical
evaluation of WACA reveals that WACA is feasible and its error
rate is as low as 1% with 30 seconds of processing time and
2− 3% for 20 seconds. The computational overhead is minimal.
Furthermore, we tested WACA against different attack scenarios.
WACA is capable of identifying insider threats with very high
accuracy (99.2%) and also robust against powerful adversaries
such as imitation and statistical attackers.
I. INTRODUCTION
The majority of the current user authentication methods rely
on password authentication. However, password authentication
methods are subject to many security drawbacks [1], [2],
[3]. Many practical attacks have been demonstrated that the
passwords can be either stolen or bypassed [4], [5], [6].
To mitigate these threats, Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)
methods were proposed [7], [8]. In MFA, the user credentials
are checked from two or more independent sources and even
if the attacker steals one factor, it would still have to overcome
the burden of other factors. MFA is indeed standardized and
recommended by some payment and government organiza-
tions [9], [10].
Whether it is one-factor or MFA, a one-time login process
does not guarantee that the identified user is the real user
throughout the login session. Even if it is an insider who has
been authorized once, a forever access is provided in most
cases not to interrupt the current user. Hence, an authentication
which re-verifies the user periodically without breaking the
continuity of the session is vital [11], [12]. Moreover, users
may share their passwords with family members, friends,
colleagues [3], or an already-authenticated user may walk
away without locking his/her computing platform (e.g., laptop)
for a short time or may intentionally hand it to a non-
authenticated co-worker trusting that s/he will not perpetrate
anything malicious, or disgruntled worker or a malicious
former employer may want to use his/her former privileges.
In all these cases, as long as the original login session is
actively used, there is no mechanism to verify that the initial
authenticated user is still the user in control of the computing
terminal.
Continuous Authentication (CA)1 is a good mechanism to re-
verify a user’s identity periodically throughout a login session.
However, this may pose inconvenience to the users. Currently,
the most common method used to verify the user periodically
depends on session time-outs. In session time-outs, if the time
period is kept too short, the user’s convenience will be reduced
due to frequent interruptions of the session for authentication.
On the other hand, if the time period is set too long, in
the case of a breach, the attacker would have more time on
the victim’s system. Moreover, the insider threat detection is
also an important functionality that needs to be considered
in continuous authentication systems as a potential attacker is
likely to be an insider [13]. Indeed, the usability of CA systems
can be increased by exploiting off-the-shelf wearable devices
as they offer many useful functionalities like controlling the
environment, keeping track of the daily activities to their users
through their built-in sensors (e.g., motion sensors, heart rate
monitoring sensor, and GPS) [14], [15]. These sensors can play
a key role to increase the usability in such a security context
as well.
In this work, we introduce a Wearable-Assisted Continuous
Authentication framework called WACA, where a wearable
device (e.g., smartwatch) is used to authenticate a computer
user continuously utilizing the motion sensors of the smart-
watch. WACA uses sensor-based keystroke dynamics, where
the typing rhythm of the user is captured by the motion sensors
of the smartwatch worn by the user. In essence, keystroke
dynamics is one of the behavioral biometrics that characterizes
the users according to their typing pattern. Most conventional
keystroke-based authentication schemes [16] have used dwell-
time and flight-time as unique features of the users. These
features are directly obtained by logging the timing between
successive keystrokes. However, in WACA, the feature set
is richer and more flexible since 6-axes motion sensor data
1CA is also sometimes called Active or Implicit Authentication in the
literature [11].
can provide not only timing information, but also the key-
pressing pressure, hand rotation, and hand displacement, etc.
Our feature set consists of 14 different sensory features from
both time and frequency domains. These features are applied
to 6-axes motion sensor data, obtaining 84 features in total.
Finally, different distance measures are used to compare the
registered and the unknown profile of the user as it was shown
that they performed well in similar contexts [17], [18].
We tested the performance and efficiency of WACA with
more than thirty real users and data collected from them. We
specifically evaluated WACA in terms of three metrics: (i) How
accurately can it differentiate between genuine and impostor
users? (ii) How fast can it detect an impostor? (iii) How
accurately can it identify an insider? Moreover, we also eval-
uated the robustness of our proposed method against powerful
attacks, including, imitation [19], [20], statistical [21], [22],
and insider attacks.
Contributions: The main contributions of this work are sum-
marized as follows:
• We propose a comprehensive sensor-based wearable-
assisted continuous authentication framework for comput-
ing platforms, terminals (e.g., laptops, computers) with
a smartwatch. We believe that this work has practical
and far-reaching implications for the future of the usable
authentication field.
• We propose a new variant of keystroke dynamics, called
sensor-based keystroke dynamics. We show that sensor-
based keystroke dynamics can be uniquely utilized to au-
thenticate and identify the users with extesive evaluation.
• We also show that, contrary to recent plausible attacks
on classical keyboard-only keystroke dynamics [19], [21],
this new authentication factor is robust against powerful
attacks, including imitation, statistical attacks, and allows
insider threat identification.
• For this purpose, we developed three generic attacking
scenarios that can also be utilized by other future contin-
uous authentication studies.
• We conducted an extensive evaluation of the proposed
method with real devices and real user data using a rich
set of distance measuring techniques for the authentica-
tion and Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) algorithm for the
identification.
Organization: The reminder of this paper is structured as
follows: In Section II, we explain the foundation for the
overall idea. Then, we introduce our system model in Sec-
tion III. The overall architecture of WACA is detailed in
Section IV. Section V presents the performance, efficiency,
and robustness evaluation of the WACA framework. It also
evaluates how WACA defends against powerful adversaries.
Section VI reports the discussion of the challenges that can
be faced in WACA and ways to overcome those challenges.
In Section VIII, we explain the related work and we make
the comparative evaluation of WACA with its alternatives for
continuous authentication. Finally, in Section IX, we conclude
the paper.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 1: (a) The reference coordinate system for accelerometer and
gyroscope sensors. (b) A sample raw data collected from the ac-
celerometer of the smartwatch and keystrokes detected by using peak
detection methods while typing the word ”smartwatch”.
II. DESIGN RATIONALE: WHY SHOULD IT WORK?
In this section, we show how motion sensors of a smart-
watch are simply impacted when typing on a keyboard and
see if the data can be really used to identify users. Particularly,
we analyze a case that a user wears a smartwatch and types
on a qwerty-type built-in keyboard of a computer. Our goal
is to collect keystroke information from the built-in motion
sensors (i.e., accelerometer and gyroscope) of the smartwatch
during the typing activity. To collect smartwatch sensor data,
we developed an Android Wear app that records the raw sensor
readings from the motion sensors.
In our experiments, we used linear acceleration composite
sensor data, which combines the data of accelerometer and
gyroscope to exclude the effect of gravity2. Note that the ac-
celerometer and gyroscope sensors provide three dimensional
sensor data, where the reference coordinate system associated
with the sensors are illustrated in Figure 1a. As the z-axis of
the accelerometer sensor is directly affected by the key up-
down movements of a user while typing, the most significant
changes are observed in the z-axis. Therefore, the z-axis of
the data provides the best information for keystroke features
such as holding time, pressing pressure, etc. Moreover, another
observation is that even if the device is placed flat on a desk,
the sensors generate a certain level of noise, which needs to
be removed by filtering as explained later.
Sample data in Figure 1b was acquired from the z-axis of
the accelerometer while typing the word “smartwatch”. It can
be seen how the value of the accelerometer makes peak points.
As the acceleration through the gravity corresponds to the
going down of the accelerometer, the peak points in the figure
correspond to the keystrokes in the typing activity. While the
amplitude of the peak is related to how strong the key press
is, the width of the peaks is associated with how long the
key is pressed. These are simple statistics that can be used to
identify the users. Comprehensive list of all the features used
in WACA is given in Section IV and will be analyzed further
in detail.
Moreover, we conducted two more simple experiments
using the accelerometer and gyroscope data on the smartwatch
2For brevity we use acceleration to refer to the linear acceleration.
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Fig. 2: Comparison of two different users’ (a) accelerometer (b)
gyroscope readings while typing the same text.
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Fig. 3: Comparison of the same user’s sensor data over two different
time intervals with (a) accelerometer, (b) gyroscope.
and we made the following two observations:
• Hypothesis 1: Different users exhibit different patterns
even if they type the same text.
In this experiment, we compared the data collected from
two different users while typing the same text. Figure 2
presents the sensor data of the two users’ accelerometer and
gyroscope data for a given time interval. The distribution of the
accelerometer data in Figure 2a shows clear differences such
as the magnitude of peaks, inter-arrival time of peak points,
width of peaks, etc. On the other hand, the gyroscope sensor
measures the rotation of the watch. As seen in Figure 2b, the
number of peaks or the magnitude of the peaks are different
for different users; so these features are viable candidates to
recognize different users.
• Hypothesis 2: Same user follows similar patterns over
different time intervals even while typing different texts.
In the second experiment, the data was collected from the
same user over two different time intervals corresponding to
the different texts and the plots are given in Figure 3. As
seen in Figure 3a, the amplitudes and widths of the peaks are
similar in magnitude, but with a phase shift, meaning leading
or lagging. On the other hand, the same leading or lagging
of similar shapes can also be seen in the gyroscope data in
Figure 3b.
These two hypotheses justify the rationale that keystroke
dynamics obtained from smartwatch’ accelerometer and gy-
roscope sensors can differentiate different users as classical
keystroke dynamics and same users can be detected over
different times even while typing different texts. Although
these are just preliminary observations, our framework are
further tested and evaluated with extensive experiments using
real user data in Section V.
III. DESIGN GOALS, ASSUMPTIONS, AND ADVERSARY
MODEL
In this section, we explain our design goals, assumptions,
and the adversary model.
Design Goals: In WACA, our design goals is similar to the
ones suggested in [23]: Our system aims to be universal (i.e.,
the biometric features exist for everyone), unique (the features
are specific for everyone), permanent (the biometric features
always exist), unobtrusive (the system works with minimal
burden), transparent (the system works without interrupting
the user), continuous (the system should provide continuous
user data), and accurate (the system works with low error
rate). WACA achieves the first five goals by its design and the
accuracy is tested in Section V.
Assumptions: For WACA, the following assumptions are
made:
• We assume that the user wears a smartwatch, which is
equipped with motion sensors and either Bluetooth or
WiFi. We also assume that an app to collect the motion
data is already installed on the smartwatch and it is paired
with the computer that will be authenticated. For this, we
built a custom Android Wear app to collect and process
the smartwatch sensor data.
• We assume that by pairing devices, a secure communica-
tion channel is already established between the computer
and smartwatch as well as between the computer and
the remote or local authentication server. This secure
communication channel should keep the sensor data
secure in both transition and at rest. Note that pairing
is only needed for creating a secure channel between
the smartwatch and terminal. A standard encryption al-
gorithm using Bluetooth can be utilized for this purpose.
• The WACA framework acts like as a complementary
to the first-factor in the authentication and it has the
flexibility to choose the first factor, but we assume the
system has a first authentication factor. The first factor
could be one of the password-, token-, or biometric-based
systems.
Adversary Model: In this paper, the primarily considered
adversary model is an attacker who somehow bypassed the first
factor (e.g., password, token) of the authentication system and
it has a physical access to the computing terminal. Particularly,
we consider an authentication setting, where users are given
passwords to use some computers and for some computers,
only high level supervisors are allowed to use. In this type
of environment, the attacker is likely to be an insider or co-
worker, but it can also be an outsider, just passing by the
victim’s computer. For example, attacker’s goals can include,
but not limited to, trying to get some important information
from the victim’s computer, taking action on behalf of the
victim, or trying to get access to the assets that s/he does not
have permission (i.e., privilege abuse).
More specifically, we consider the following attack scenar-
ios:
• Attack Scenario 1: The victim is one of the employers
and forgets to lock his computer and an outsider (e.g., a
mail courier) who is just passing through the office tries to
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Fig. 4: WACA framework architecture and key components
get access to the victim’s computer. Since WACA assume
all the legitimate users’ including insiders’ smartwatches
are paired with the computing terminals, the system will
easily reject the outsiders as no input from the smartwatch
is provided. Even if the attacker has somehow obtained
the smartwatch (i.e., the victim can forget it on the desk),
the attacker can not provide the victim’ typing pattern (as
a behavioral biometric).
• Attack Scenario 2: We consider the attacker is either an
innocent co-worker or a malicious insider and thereby the
attacker also has a registered smartwatch, but its typing
profile is registered together with its own username. This
type of attacker tries to get access to the system’s assets
that s/he does not have permission (i.e., privilege abuse).
In this scenario, the attacker watches its victim (e.g.,
supervisor) for a suitable timing that its victim leaves the
computer unlocked for some time to go to lunch or to get
coffee etc. (aka lunchtime attack [13]). The attacker can
either try to bypass the system via providing data from
his smartwatch or can try to use the victim’s smartwatch
somehow obtained (e.g., can steal it or victim can leave
it behind).
• More Powerful Adversaries: Furthermore, a powerful
adversary can be aware of WACA and try to defeat
it using special tools and skills by imitating legitimate
users [19], [20] or launching statistical attacks [21], [22].
This powerful adversary (insider or outsider) can be a
human or a trained bot. In imitation attacks, the attacker
wears the victim’s smartwatch either via after stealing it
or the victim can leave it behind for a while and the
attacker can try to impersonate the victim. On the other
hand, the statistical attack is more complex and requires
special tools and skills. Hence, WACA also considers
these powerful attack scenarios in its adversary model.
The security evaluation of these attack scenarios and how
WACA is robust against insiders, imitators, and statistical
attackers are explained more in Sections V-A and V-B.
IV. WACA ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we present the details of the WACA
framework, which is a typing-based continuous authentication
system using the accelerometer and gyroscope sensors of a
smartwatch. Note that the WACA framework is complemen-
tary to the first factor authentication mechanisms and it is
flexible to work with any first factor, including one of the
password-, token-, or biometric-based systems. Note that the
first factor authentication is beyond the scope of this work.
A. Overview
WACA consists of four main stages: Preprocessing, Feature
Extraction, User Profiling, and Decision Module. These stages,
which are shown in Figure 4, work as follows: First, the raw
sensor data is acquired from a smartwatch (1) through an
app installed on the watch. Then, the raw data is transmitted
to the computer through a secure wireless channel and the
rest of the stages are performed on the computer except that
Authentication Server (AS) is located in a trusted place. As
the collected data includes a certain level of noise, in the
preprocessing stage, the raw data is cleaned up by filtering
(2) and transformed into a proper format for the next stages.
The incoming data is used to extract a set of features (3).
This set of features, namely feature vector, represents the
characteristics of the current user profile. In the enrollment
phase (9), the created feature vector is stored in the AS. In
the verification phase (4), the queried user profile is dispatched
from the AS to the decision module (10, 11). The decision
module computes a similarity score between the returned
profile and the provided profile for the current user to make
a binary authentication decision (match/no match). If the
decision is a no match (5), then the user’s access to computing
terminal will be suspended and the user will be required to
re-authenticate using the primary authentication method (e.g.,
password). However, when the decision is a match (6) then
the user’s access will be maintained. The profile of the current
user in the AS will be updated after the correct match of the
user profile (7). In WACA, this update frequency is a system
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parameter and can be set by the admin in the security policy.
In this way, the user profile will be kept up-to-date over time.
Whenever a typing activity is initiated on the keyboard of the
computer, the smartwatch will be notified (8) again by the
terminal to start over the authentication process continuously.
In the following subsections, we explain the details of WACA
and its key stages.
B. Data Collection
In WACA, data collection refers to capturing sensor read-
ings from the user’s smartwatch through a secure wireless
communication channel (i.e., via WiFi or Bluetooth). An app is
installed on smartwatch to listen to the physical sensors. Then,
the raw sensor data is transmitted to the computer through a
secure communication channel.
Each row of the collected raw data of accelerometer is
represented in the format of ~acc =< ta, xa, ya, za > and
gyroscope is represented as ~gyro =< tg, xg, yg, zg >, where
t stands for timestamps and x, y, z represent the different axis
values of the accelerometer and gyroscope sensors. Each of
t, x, y, and z is stored as a different vector. The length of
the vectors directly depends on sampling rate of the sensors
and the time interval of the data collection. In WACA, the
parameter sample size refers to the length of these vectors and
it is set as a configurable parameter while the parameter sample
rate is a constant system parameter that is characterized by the
wearable device and app.
C. Preprocessing
In WACA, the preprocessing stage refers to preparation
of raw sensor readings for the next stages. It consists of
cleaning and transformation of the raw data. In the cleaning
part, the noise is removed. In order to remove the effect of
the noise from data, we apply M-point Moving Average Filter
(MAF) [24], which is actually a simple low-pass filter and
it operates by taking the average of M neighbour points and
generates a single output. M-point filtering in equation form
can be expressed as follows: y[i] = 1
M
∑M−1
j=0 x[i+ j], where
x is the raw sensor data, y is the new filtered data, and i
indicates the current sample that is averaged. The filtered data
becomes smoother than the raw data without altering the value
at that point.
After filtering the noise, the data is transformed into appro-
priate forms for the next stage. Particularly, different types
of sensor data are separated according to an assigned ID
number during the sensor registration and then x, y, and z
axes of the sensor values are recorded as different vectors
e.g., ~xa =< xa
1, ..., xa
n > and ~xg =< xg
1, ..., xg
n > for a
profile of n samples.
D. Feature Extraction & User Profiling
In WACA, Feature Extraction (FE) refers to the transforma-
tion of the time series raw data into a number of features.
These extracted features will be used to create the feature
vector of the user. The feature vector is the summary of the
profile, which is checked in the decision module stage.
TABLE I: Feature set extracted from sensor data in WACA.
Domain Feature Length
Time
Mean, Median, Variance, Aver-
age Absolute Difference of Peaks,
Range, Mode, Covariance, Mean
Absolute Deviation (MAD), Inter-
quartile Range (IQR), correlation
between axes (xy, yz, xz), Skew-
ness, Kurtosis
12*6=72
Frequency Entropy, Spectral energy 2*6=12
Total # of Features 84
In order to create the feature vector, each feature is com-
puted using the data vectors. As an example, the first feature is
calculated from a function f , i.e., f1 = f(xa, ya, za, xg, yg, zg)
and the second feature is calculated from another function g,
i.e., f2 = g(xa, ya, za, xg, yg, zg) etc. Then, the final feature
vector ~f =< f1, f2, ..., fn > is generated using all the
calculated features.
As each element of the feature vector has different ranges,
some of the features can be dominant in the distance measure-
ment. To prevent this and create a scale-invariant feature vector,
we apply a normalization to the feature vector to map the
interval [xmin, xmax] into the unit scale [0,1]. We formulate
this linear normalization process in WACA as follows: xnew =
x−xmin
xmax−xmin
, xmin and xmax are the minimum and maximum
value of the features of the user’s enrolled templates.
After generating the final feature vector ~f , in the user
profiling stage, a user profile ~p is generated by adding the
user ID and start and end timestamps of the data sample,
i.e., ~p =< userID, tstart, tend, ~f >. If the user is in the
enrollment phase, this profile is transmitted to the AS to be
stored in a database. Finally, if the user is unknown and
a typing activity notification comes from the computer, the
profile is passed to the Decision Module.
The feature set used in our framework is presented in Table I.
These features were chosen as they performed well in similar
contexts [25], [26], [17], [18]. Note that, though, WACA
uses both time and frequency domain features. The feature
set includes simple statistical metrics such as mean, median,
variance of each 3-axis of the sensors readings and also
advanced similarity metrics like covariance and correlation
coefficients between the axes. While the statistical metrics are
early indicators to show the tendency or intensity of the set,
the similarity metrics help to differentiate between the users
making hand motions in one or multiple directions when typ-
ing. Moreover, absolute of peaks is used to calculate average
timing information between successive keystrokes. Covariance
of two random variables X and Y in WACA is calculated as
follows: covariance(X,Y ) = E([X − E(X)][Y − E(Y )]),
where X and Y corresponds to the different axis of the
accelerometer and gyroscope and E() is the expected value
of the variable in the WACA framework. Similarly, the cor-
relation can be calculated from the covariance as follows:
correlation(X,Y ) = cov(X,Y )√
var(X)var(Y )
. Particularly, correla-
tion and covariance of the pairs (xa, ya), (xa, za), and (ya, za)
are calculated for accelerometer, then, the same process is
repeated to obtain the features of the gyroscope data.
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In addition to these time domain features, the set also
includes frequency domain features like entropy and spectral
energy. The frequency domain features are based on the
different typing frequency (period) behaviours of users. The
different frequency impacts the energy calculation correspond-
ing to spectral energy and randomness of the feature set
corresponding to the entropy. In WACA, spectral energy of a
signal is easily calculated from Fast-Fourier Transform (FFT)
of the signal. FFT generates the frequency content of the
time domain stationary signals over an interval. FFT of a
signal is represented using complex numbers, which includes
both amplitude and phase information. The spectral energy in
WACA is calculated as follows: energy(X) =
∑
|FFT (X)|2
n
,
where n is the number of FFT points and || refers the
magnitude of the given complex value of the sensed data. In
WACA, the spectral energy is used to differentiate the users
with different dominant frequency in both acceleration and
torque while typing. Different dominant frequencies generate
different spectral energies. On the other hand, the entropy
is the measure of uncertainty and a higher entropy means
more flatness in the histogram of the frequency distribution.
The entropy of a random variable X of values x1, x2, ..., xn
with the probabilities p1, p2, ..., pn is calculated as follows:
entropy(X) = −∑nj=1 pj log2(pj). In WACA, the entropy
will discriminate between the users with random motion and
the ones following similar pattern during the entirety of the
typing activity.
E. Decision Module
The next stage in WACA is the decision module. The
task of this stage is classifying the user as authorized or
unauthorized for given credentials entered during the initial
login. For the purpose of authentication, we use distance
measures. The distance measure methods simply calculate the
distance between two vectors or data points in a coordinate
plane. It is directly related to the similarity of compared time-
series data sets. The most widely used distance measure is
Euclidean Distance. It is actually just the distance between two
points in vector space and is the particular case of Minkowski
Distance, which is expressed as follows:
distance(~x, ~y) = (
n∑
i=1
(xi − yi)p)
1
p , (1)
where ~x = (x1, x2, ..., xn) and ~y = (y1, y2, ..., yn) are the set
of sensor observations to be compared. If p = 2, it is Euclidean
distance and has been extensively used in the keystroke-based
authentication methods [27]. WACA calculates the distance
and returns the result by comparing it with a configurable
predetermined threshold value (i.e., genuine if distance <
threshold, impostor if distance ≥ threshold).
In addition to Euclidean and Minkowski Distances, there
are several distance measurement methods utilized in bio-
metric authentication systems which may perform differently
depending on the context. Therefore, we also tested different
distance metrics in our experiments to see which performs
the best for WACA. Other distance metrics that we tested in
our experiments are Cosine Distance, Correlation Distance,
Manhattan (Cityblock) Distance and Minkowski with p=5. The
performance of each one is given in Section V-A.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the efficacy of WACA using data
from real users. We also explain the details of our experiment
setup, methodology, and performance metrics, and discuss
the results. While evaluating WACA, we considered three
evaluation metrics, which are as follows:
1) How accurately can it differentiate between genuine and
impostor users?
2) How fast can it detect an impostor?
3) How accurately can it identify an insider?
Specifically, we primarily focus on measuring the detection ac-
curacy and speed of WACA. We, first, conduct authentication
experiments. In these, we measure how WACA performs when
users type a different or the same text. We also analyze how
the sample size and the detection technique impact WACA’s
performance. Second, we measure how successful WACA
is against insider threats. Third, we test the robustness of
the framework against more advanced attacks, imitation and
statistical attacks. Finally, we evaluate the overhead of WACA.
Data and Collection Methodology. In our experiments, we
collected data from 343 human subjects whose ages ranged
from 18 to 38 with a mean of 25.5 and standard deviation of
4.1 using two different smartwatches. The detailed information
about participants are given in Table II. Furthermore, note
that our research study with the human subjects was con-
ducted with the appropriate Institutional Review Board (IRB)
approvals.
TABLE II: Characteristics of participants
Age
Mean 25.4
Std 4.1
Gender
Male 22
Female 12
Smartwatch Brand
Samsung Gear Live 20
LG G Watch R 14
Watch Hand Preference
Right 7
Left 27
During the collection of data, an Android Wear smartwatch
with an installed data collection app was distributed to the
participants and the participants were asked to type a text
while the program in the smartwatch was recording its sensory
data. The participants were free to choose the hand (left/right)
on which they wore the smartwatch. Moreover, they were
also given the freedom to adjust the sitting position and the
keyboard and screen position according to their comfort levels.
Throughout these experiments, we utilized a standalone qwerty
keyboard to have generic results. Before typing each text, the
participants were also given enough time to read the texts to
make them familiar with the text as typing a familiar text is a
more common activity.
3Not all of them participated in all experiments.
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Fig. 5: EER for each participant with a sample size of 1000
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1. Average EER is 0.0513.
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Fig. 6: EER for each participant with a sample size=1000 using
Manhattan (Cityblock) distance metric during Typing Task-2. Aver-
age EER is 0.0647.
The participants were involved in three typing tasks con-
ducted in three different sessions. They were asked to type
with their normal typing style without noticing that their data
was recorded. The three data sets were compiled as follows:
• Dataset-1, Typing Task-1: The participants were asked to
type a story from a set of short and simple stories from
the American Literature4 for four minutes. The story was
chosen randomly by the participants. On average, four
minutes of data corresponds to 25000 readings for each
participant (Total: 850000 readings).
• Dataset-2, Typing Task-2: For this data set, all the partic-
ipants were asked to type the same text5 for four minutes.
For each participant, almost the same amount of data is
collected as Dataset-1. This dataset is important to be
able to measure the quality of the features.
• Dataset-3, Typing Task-3: The participants were in-
structed to imitate someone else’ (victim) typing pat-
tern by watching the prerecorded video of the other
person. For these experiments, one of the participants
was recorded on video while typing from a perspective
that the hand motions, smartwatch, keyboard, and the
screen could be seen. Although it was not required, the
perspective allowed to infer what the victim was typing
by watching. This dataset was primarily used to analyze
the attacking scenarios.
Note that in all the experiments, the datasets obtained
from all these tasks were always used by cross-validation
techniques (i.e., partitioning the data set into randomly chosen
two sets for training and testing). Therefore, even if the same
text was typed by all the participants in Typing Task-2, the
compared samples always corresponded to different texts for
a participant.
In order to characterize the participants’ typing performance,
the typed text was also recorded, in addition to the sensor data,
and was analyzed. In this regard, the participants’ typing speed
was also measured. We observed the typing speeds between
20 and 75 words per minute (wpm) on average.
In our experiments, we split the collected data sets into
equal size chunks, called sample size. It is the number of
4https://americanliterature.com/100-great-short-stories
5https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The Adventures of Tom Sawyer
samples (i.e., row) in a chunk. Each chunk consists of 8
columns of data, two of which are timestamps and the others
are 6 dimensional sensor data. Sample size is the main system
design parameter in our experiments as it has a direct impact
on the time required to collect data. Particularly, the time t
required to collect data with the sample size can be represented
as t = sample size/100 in seconds as the sampling rate in
our experiments was 100Hz.
As discussed in Section IV-E, the decision module in WACA
computes similarity of an unknown sample with the one
stored in the authentication server. Then, in order to decide
whether an unknown user is accepted or rejected, the decision
module compares a similarity score, a value of [0, 1], with a
predefined parameter threshold. In our experiments, we also
tested WACA’s decision module with five different distance
measuring techniques and reported the performance of each
technique.
Performance Metrics. In the authentication experiments, we
used Equal Error Rate (EER) as it is a commonly accepted
metric to assess the accuracy of WACA. EER is calculated
using two metrics: False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and False
Reject Rate (FRR). FAR is the rate of incorrectly accepted
unauthorized users among all the illegal attempts: The increase
in FAR is a direct threat to system’s security level. For more
valuable assets, increasing the threshold will decrease FAR. On
the other hand, FRR is the rate of incorrectly rejected autho-
rized users among all the legitimate authentication attempts.
Contrary to FAR, FRR can be decreased by decreasing the
value of threshold. Finally, EER is the point that gives the
closest FAR and FRR point for a given threshold (ideal EER
is the intersection point of FAR and FRR) and the lower the
EER the better is an authentication system.
A. Results
In this section, we present and discuss the evaluation results.
Impact of the text dependency. In this experiment, our goal
is to analyze how EER changes among the participants. We
try to answer the question: How does WACA perform with
the typed text? This is also a more advanced analysis of the
framework and the fundamental idea than that of in Section
2.
7
sample size
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
E
E
R
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
2000 2500 3000
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
euclidean (p=2) cosine correlation cityblock minkowski (p=5)
Fig. 7: Average EER according to different sample sizes using
different distance metrics while users are performing Typing Task-
1.
Specifically, for this experiment, we used Typing Tasks 1
(any text) and Typing Task 2 (the same text) datasets. For each
sample of a particular user, we computed the differences from
other users’ samples. For this purpose, we computed the NxN
dissimilarity matrix, where N is the total number of samples
for all the participants. The dissimilarity matrix was calculated
by measuring the similarity of each sample to all the other
samples using leave-one-out cross-validation method [28].
Then, for a given threshold and participant, the ratio of
the rejected and accepted samples were computed to obtain
FRR and FAR, respectively. This process was repeated by
incrementing the threshold by 0.01 in each step for all the
samples of all the participants. This gave us a set of EER for
each participant. Note that in a real system, FAR/FRR rate
can be tuned according to the system preferences, but here
our purpose is to find an acceptable performance metric for
WACA. The results are plotted in Figure 5 for Typing Task-1
and Figure 6 for Typing Task-2. Average EER for the Typing
Task-1 experiment was 0.0513. Figure 6 compares the EER of
participants for the Typing Task-2 experiment. Average EER
for this experiment was 0.0647. Another observation from the
plots is that some participants have more distinctive typing
characteristics than others using both the datasets.
If we compare the ERR of each participant in both the ex-
periments, we see that they are also close to each other, where
a few of the participants perform very distinctive behaviours
(e.g., participant 21). However, the overall distribution of EER
over the participants is similar in both the experiments. Recall
that in Typing Task-1, all the participants typed different texts,
while they typed the same text in Typing Task-2.
Overall, in this analysis we report the average EERs of
both the experiments are close (around %1), which supports
the usability of WACA regardless of the typed text for the
continuous authentication session.
Impact of the sample size and the distance measuring
technique. In these experiments, our goal was to assess how
different sample sizes and the distance measuring techniques
used in WACA impact the performance. For this, we varied
the sample size from 300 to 3000 and utilized five different
distance measuring techniques, Euclidean (p=2), Cosine, Cor-
relation, Cityblock, and Minkowski (p=5). Again, two types
of participant datasets, Typing Task-1 (any text) and Typing
Task-2 (the same text), were used. Figure 7 (Typing Task-1)
and Figure 8 (Typing Task-2) present the main results when
the sample size increases.
As can be seen in Figure 7 when the participants typed
different texts, the EERs are generally decreasing with the
increase of sample sizes as expected. The EERs go under
0.05 after the sample size of 1500 for all the distance met-
rics utilized except for Minkowski (p=5). Then, the EER is
converging to the value of 0.01-0.02 through the sample size
of 3000. In the best case, EER 0.007 is achieved with the the
sample size of 2750 for the Manhattan (cityblock) distance
measurement technique.
Figure 8 presents the results of the same-text experiment
(Typing Task-2). As in Figure 7, the general behavior is that
the EERs are decreasing with the increase of the samples. The
lowest EER of 0.01 is achieved using the Cityblock distance
measuring technique at 3000. We also see the convergence of
EER in Figure 8 as Figure 7. Plots are starting to converge
around sample sizes 1500-2000 and converging to 0.01 for
Cityblock and Correlation distance measuring techniques. We
also see that at 3000, 0.02 EER is obtained for Cosine and
Correlation techniques. However, if shorter data collection
time is of interest, a sample size of 2000, which needs 20
seconds for data collection, gives 0.03-0.04 EER. However, if
we increase the sample size, both the accuracy and the data
collection time are increasing. This means the time needed to
catch an adversary or more generally the re-verification period
would also increase. Therefore, an optimal sample size should
be adjusted according to the preferences in a real application
based on the usage needs or the security policies.
To conclude, the features in WACA can successfully differen-
tiate the users from their typing rhythm with a very small error
rate (1%) independent of the typed text. There is a natural
trade-off between the EER and data collection time, which
should be configured according to the security needs of an
organization.
The accuracy of insider threat identification. As noted
earlier, the insider threat detection is important in continuous
authentication systems as a potential attacker is likely to
be an insider. In order to effectively locate such an insider
attacker within an organization where WACA is employed, an
identification mechanism is needed. Hence, WACA includes
Multilayer Perceptron algorithm (MLP) [29] to defend against
and identify insider threats. MLP is a feedforward neural
network model which maps a set of input data into a set
of outputs through the interconnected processing elements
(neurones) [30]. We used MLP for the task of identification.
Identification is a one-to-many classification task and requires
a training set. We assume that the insider’s data is also
stored in the authentication server’s database (training set) as
a legitimate user. We used MLP since it gave the best results
in our experiments.
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Fig. 8: Average EER according to different sample sizes using
different distance metrics while users are performing Typing Task-
2.
In order to analyze the efficacy of WACA against insider
threats, we analyzed the impact of the sample size and the
size of the training data on accuracy. For this, we focused on
two test scenarios that could be relevant in real investigations:
Scenario 1: In the first scenario, we built our test model
using the same text and tested again using the same text
with the 5-fold cross validation technique. For this scenario,
we utilized Typing Task-2 Dataset for both the training and
testing. This type of scenario can be useful as all the users are
asked to type a provided text and during the investigation, all
users are asked again to type the same text. The results are
presented in Table III. Scenario 2: In the second scenario, the
test model was trained with the same text dataset, which is
the same for all the participants and tested using random-text
experiments, where each user typed a randomly chosen text.
For this scenario, we utilized Typing Task-2, Typing Task-1
Datasets for training and testing, respectively. This scenario is
suitable for cases where all the users are enrolled using the
same text, but a user is verified while typing a random text.
The results for this test scenario are presented in Table IV.
As can be seen in Table III, in the best case, 99.2%
identification rate of an insider threat can be achieved with
the sample size of 1500 while the model is trained with 5
samples. Even with 2 samples of the insider, 93.7% accuracy
rate can be achieved with the sample size of 1500.
TABLE III: Scenerio 1: The same text is used for both training and
testing using the Multilayer Perceptron algorithm.
The accuracy of insider threat identification (%)
Training Set
Sample size 1 2 3 4 5
1500 77.8 93.7 97.2 98.4 99.2
1000 62.8 87.6 93.8 95.3 97.1
500 37.5 63.7 75.9 83.1 89.6
250 28.5 43 53.1 61.8 62.1
Scenario 2 aims to answer the question of ”Can an insider
be identified while typing a random text even if s/he is enrolled
while typing a given text ?” Table IV presents the result of
this question for Scenario 2. As can be seen from Table IV,
similar to Scenario 1, the accuracy rates increase as the sample
sizes and training set increase, and the time to build model and
time required to catch the attacker is also increasing. 3 training
samples and the sample size is 1500 or 4 training samples with
the sample size of 1000 may be the two most optimal choices
for real cases.
TABLE IV: Scenerio 2: All users are trained with the same text and
tested with random texts using the Multilayer Perceptron algorithm.
The accuracy of insider threat identification (%)
Training Set
Sample size 1 2 3 4 5
1500 55.8 80.1 88.7 89.8 91.8
1000 51.7 82.7 83.2 86.1 86.8
500 29.9 51.3 66.7 73.8 76.5
250 22.1 33.6 41.9 49.8 54.1
Overall, WACA can achieve 0.01 error rate with almost 30
seconds of the data collection (see Figure 7 and 8) in the best
case. If a shorter time is of interest, 0.02 error rate is achieved
with 20 seconds of the data collection. Moreover, if 5 training
samples with 1500 sample sizes are obtained from a potential
insider threat, WACA could identify the insider with 99.2%
accuracy rate while typing the provided text (see Table III)
or with 91.8% accuracy rate while typing a random text (see
Table IV).
B. Advanced Attacks on WACA with More Powerful Adver-
saries
In this subsection, we evaluate the performance of WACA
against two powerful attacks: imitation [19], [20] and statisti-
cal [21], [22] attacks. In these attacks, the attacker is aware of
WACA and can try to defeat WACA using special tools and
skills. For this purpose, we also developed generic attacking
scenarios that can also be utilized by other future continuous
authentication studies.
Various attacks against classical keystroke dynamics that
exist in the literature can also be used to attack WACA. The
attacker can be a human or a trained bot. A human-type
attacker can perform zero-effort attacks6 [31] or imitation
attacks [19] to defeat the WACA’s authentication system. In
zero-effort attacks, the attacker tries to defeat the authentica-
tion system without any effort or prior knowledge. Zero-effort
attacks will not be successful due to the low EER values in
WACA as analyzed in the previous sub-sections. However, the
effectiveness of the imitation attacks performed by a human
should be investigated as noted in some recent studies [19],
[20].
In addition to these attacks, another recent attack against
the behavioral biometrics [21], [22] has emerged, which is
called statistical attacks. In this attack, a bot is first trained
using typical user data from a large population. Then, the
bot generates random permutations of the features to mimic
a legitimate user. In addition to human and robot attacks, a
6Also called zero-information attack.
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Fig. 9: Attacker accept rates for different sample sizes. The results
show that even though an imitation attacker is aware of WACA in
a targeted system, s/he has no more advantage than a zero-effort
attacker.
replay attack using a key-logger [32] is noted in the literature,
which can also be performed against the keystroke dynamics.
However, a key-logger installed on the computer can obtain
only the timing of the keystrokes, which is solely not enough
to use it in a replay attack against WACA as there is not a
way that a key-logger can obtain the three dimensional sensor
data collected by the smartwatch. In the next sub-sections we
consider these two powerful attacks (imitation and statistical)
and investigate the effectiveness of WACA against them. In
these cases, the attacker would have somehow obtained the
victim’s smartwatch or manipulates his smartwatch. We use
the zero-effort attacks as a baseline to evaluate the success of
the imitation and statistical attacks. In imitation attacks, the
attacker either steals the victim’s smartwatch or the victim can
leave it behind for a while, then the attacker wears the victim’s
smartwatch and can try to impersonate him while attacking.
On the other hand, the statistical attack is more complex and
requires special tools and skills. In this type of attack, we
assume the attacker can provide its input data to the system.
It manipulates its username and profile data to get an access
to the computer that he does not have permission.
1) Imitation Attacks: In this subsection, we evaluate the
performance of an imitating adversary, who knows that WACA
is already installed on the current system. The adversary is
assumed to be watching his victim by standing nearby or
trying to imitate the victim’s typing style by looking at the
previously recorded video of the victim while typing. S/he is
also assumed to be opportunistically waiting for the right time
to mimic the victim. In order to replicate this imitation attack
scenario, we recorded a 15 seconds video of a legitimate user
and presented this video to an attacker (i.e., another participant
in our experiments). The video showed the user as s/he was
typing and thus the hand, fingers, watch and keyboard were all
clearly visible. By watching the video (multiple times allowed
in experiments), the attacker tried to imitate the legitimate
user. Note that this scenario would increase the chances of a
successful attack when compared to a real-life case where the
attacker would possibly only have limited opportunity to watch
Fig. 10: 3 different statistical attacks against WACA with different
sample sizes. These results show that despite the small increase
compared to zero-effort, the attacker does not have a chance to defeat
WACA using the systematically generated fake data.
a victim. We also collected the victim’s typing data to evaluate
the performance of the attackers. We computed EER for this
attack scenario and compared it with the case when there was
a zero-effort for the attack. In the zero-effort attack, we used
the data set obtained in Typing Task-1 Dataset. We applied the
leave-one-out method [28] by leaving the victim’s data out as
in the other authentication experiments while calculating EER
(i.e., the intersection of FAR and FRR) of the victim. In the
imitation attack, since we only had the impostor attempts, EER
would be equal to the attacker’s acceptance rate. We also note
that WACA was directly tested without any change. The results
are presented in Figure 9.
As presented in Figure 9, the attackers have different success
rates (attacker accept rate) for different sample sizes. The
highest success rate was achieved when the sample size is
equal to 500, but the success rates are decreasing to much
lower rates as the sample sizes increase. A sample size of
500 corresponds to almost 2-3 keystrokes for the sampling
rate used, which is not enough to measure and settle down
for some of the features. So, this is not practical from the
attacker’s perspective. Beyond 1500, which corresponds to 15
seconds of sensor readings, the probability of an attacker to
imitate a user is significantly decreasing (i.e., 0.04). These
results indicate that even though an attacker is aware of WACA
in a targeted system, s/he still has a very low chance to be
successful.
2) Statistical Attacks: In this subsection, we evaluate
WACA against statistical attacks. In this attack scenario, it
is assumed that the attacker has a database obtained from AS
consisting of the user profiles. Similar to the imitation attack,
it is also assumed that the attacker has a capability to provide
its input to system. As mentioned earlier, this can occur either
by obtaining the victim’s smartwatch or if the attacker is an
insider, it can manipulate its own input data to deceive WACA.
It is also worth mentioning that we assume the attacker has
only a limited amount of time to attack; therefore, it only tries
the data that has the highest chance to get in, which we will
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refer to as topBins in the attack algorithm that will utilized
and noted below.
Note that statistical attacks are very powerful attacks and
it is successfully implemented to bypass the conventional
keystroke-based systems [21]. It is based on the generation
of fake (synthetic) inputs using common features of a given
population. The idea behind this attack is using the random
combination of the most frequent features of the population to
defeat the authentication system. We designed the following
attack scenario to test WACA against the statistical attacks.
In our attack, we used both Typing Task-1 and Typing
Task-2 datasets as input. Each participant was chosen as a
victim iteratively and the other participants’ samples were used
to generate forged data samples. Then, the forged samples
were used to attack the victim. For this, a histogram was
generated for each feature of all the participants in the datasets
except the victim. The forged samples were generated as in
Algorithm 1 in Appendix A. Overall, we created three different
statistical attackers with three different capabilities (bin sizes
in the histogram). Statistical Attacker-1, Statistical Attacker-2,
and Statistical Attacker-3. Before running the algorithm for
attacking on WACA, we first calculated the EER for each
user without adding any forged data. Similar to the imita-
tion attacks, the attacker acceptance rate in zero-effort attack
corresponds to the average EER. We conducted experiments
without attack under varying sample and bin sizes. The results
are shown in Figure 10.
In Figure 10, we can see that bin number 50 has the most
successful result on attacking victims. This is because if we
increase the bin number and keep the bins with the highest
number of occurrences constant, the width of the bins will
narrow; so, the range of the forged data will be confined to a
very small range. On the other hand, if we decrease the bin
number significantly, the less frequently occurred bins will
also be included in the sample generation range, which will
decrease the success rate of the attacks. Finally, we note that
in the attack scenario, we choose each user in our dataset as
a victim in an iterative way. These results show that despite
the small increase compared to zero-effort, the attacker does
not have a chance to defeat WACA using the systematically
generated fake data due to its high dimensional feature vector
in WACA’s design.
As a summary, neither the imitation nor statistical attacks
puts WACA in danger as their success rates are very close
to zero-effort attacks. The strength of WACA is from its
high-dimensional feature vector and data originating from
independent sensory sources.
C. Resource Consumption
In WACA, a smartwatch, a computer, and an authentication
server work together. In this subsection, we only analyze the
resource consumption of relatively constrained smartwatches.
It is worth noting that we monitored the consumption of our
application while it was running continuously; however, in
WACA the data collection app does not have to be running
continuously. It can happen periodically or on-demand because
TABLE V: Resource consumption of the smartwatches used in the
experiments: LG Watch R and Samsung Gear Live.
LG G Samsung
Watch R Gear Live
CPU (no WACA) 4.5% 4.5%
CPU (w/WACA) 7.5% 16.8%
Memory (no WACA) 4.5 MB 4.5 MB
Memory (w/WACA) 15.2 MB 13.8 MB
Battery 10Hz 1.1% 1.2%
30Hz 1.6% 0.3%
100Hz 2.1% 2.4%
Data Size 10Hz 0.3 MB 0.3 MB
30Hz 0.6 MB 0.9 MB
100Hz 4.1 MB 6.5 MB
the data collection runs only when the smartwatch is notified
by the computer that the user is typing on. We analyse the
performance of both LG G Watch R and Samsung Gear Live
smartwatches used in the experiments. Both smartwatches
have Cortex-A7 at 1.2GHz and 512MB RAM, but Samsung
uses 300mAh battery, while LG is using 410mAh battery. The
results are presented in Table V.
In all the experiments, we both monitored the memory
and CPU resource utilization of the smartwatches in the
default mode (i.e., not actively running any app - no WACA)
and while the app was running (w/WACA). In the default
mode, both smartwatches used almost 4.5MB memory and
4.5% CPU their consumption while the app was running as
shown in Table V. As compared to the default memory usage
(no WACA), the memory consumption in the smartwatch in
WACA is increasing, but it is still at an acceptable rate.
In addition to memory and CPU consumption, we also
analyzed the power consumption and data size while running
our app for 10 minutes. We excluded the power consumption
of the screen as the screen can be turned-off or the smartwatch
can be in the ambient mode during the data collection of
WACA. We see that the power consumption of the app scales
by the sampling frequency. However, when we decrease the
sampling rate, the time needed to collect a certain amount
of data will also increase. Hence, the optimum sampling rate
should be tuned according to the desired security policy.
VI. DISCUSSION
Security Policy Implementation Considerations. WACA
works by checking if the current user’s profile matched the
profile of the logged-in user. When an unauthorized access
attempt is detected, the reaction depends on the previously
decided security policy. Depending on the security policy,
when an attacker is detected, the screen can be locked and
the user can be challenged to re-login; the management and
security teams can be alerted in real-time; or a notification
email can be sent to the registered e-mail of the logged-in user,
and so on. Moreover, we showed that WACA can differentiate
an insider from an outsider accurately. In suspicious cases, the
administrator can do further investigation to detect the insider,
and as we noted earlier, the insider detection is possible in
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WACA. We also note that even if WACA catches an insider
attacker, WACA can not know if the attacker has the full key,
which is out of scope this work. Therefore, even if the system
is logged-out, an insider can log-in again if it has the full key.
Therefore, resetting the initial authentication factor should be
considered in the security policy in this case. Finally, the server
can also log the failed attempts to prevent from attacks aiming
to drain the smartwatch’s battery.
Privacy. In WACA, the computer and the wearable are the
devices that belong to the user or belong to the same authen-
tication realm and thus are trusted. The only device that may
threaten the privacy is the AS. In WACA, after collecting the
raw sensor data from the smartwatch, either the raw sensor
data can be transmitted to the AS, or the features can be
computed on the smartwatch and the the feature vector can
be transmitted. If the raw sensor data is sent to the AS, the
AS may try to infer the user’s typed characters from the raw
sensor data. The more secure way would be to compute the
features on the smartwatch and to keep the feature vectors of
the profiles of the users in the AS. In that case, the transmitted
feature vector has only the mean of the values of the multi-
dimensional sensor data and thus inferring the typed characters
would not be possible at the AS.
VII. LIMITATIONS
Absence of the biometric. WACA needs to capture sufficient
amount of sensor data when a user is typing in order to
authenticate him/her as a legitimate user. Therefore, WACA
can perform better for applications that heavily rely on users
typing text such as word processors. However, the user may
not always be typing or the smartwatch may not always
provide sensor data. Examples of such cases can occur when
the user is watching a movie or scrolling through a doc-
ument and thus not touching the keyboard. Therefore, the
biometric may not be always present. Indeed, the absence
of the biometric is an issue for all the currently proposed
continuous authentication methods [33]. In these cases, the
straightforward solution is that the user can disable WACA
for that duration. Disabling WACA will default to the initial
security level of the system. Fortunately, WACA can provide
a better solution for these inactive cases. If the smartwatch
deployed for data collection has a proximity sensor (or using
the Bluetooth signal strengths [20]), the user’s closeness to the
computer can be checked. If the user moves away, then the
user can be logged out. However, this approach would not be
effective if the watch is stolen and worn by somebody else.
Other than long time inactivity of the user, some individuals
may read a book, use the mouse only, and enter short text
snippets like emails. In these cases, the user will be typing
rarely or typing only short texts. WACA can still increase
the security of this kind of usage scenarios by combining it
with the traditional time-out methods. The traditional time-
out methods postpone the lock whenever an activity has been
detected. This postpone mechanism can be replaced with
WACA so that whenever WACA identifies the user, the locking
can be postponed. In this way, the security of the system will
not be relying on the blindly detection of activity; instead it
relies on the identification of the user.
Finally, the absence of the biometric will occur if the smart-
watch’ battery depletes and the smartwatch batteries do not
last long before one needs to charge them and note that most
of the batteries have an estimated life of 1-3 days [34]. We
provide a detailed resource consumption analysis in Section
V-C.
Abnormal cases. In WACA, if the smartwatch data of the at-
tacker is available and an interaction with the keyboard occurs,
WACA detects the attacker with high probability. However,
there are two more cases which should be considered:
1) No interaction, but data: Smartwatch provides data
while there is no interaction with the keyboard.
2) Interaction, but no data: No smartwatch data is available
while there exists an interaction with the keyboard.
In the first case, the currently logged-in user is nearby and
doing something else, but not typing or typing in a nearby
device not on the logged-in computer and forgets to lock the
computer. If the current user is doing something else, there
is no problem since the proper authentication data will not be
provided by the user. However, if the user is nearby and typing
on another device, the WACA will be vulnerable to attack since
it will authenticate the user and keep the computer unlocked
as far as the proper typing data is provided.
In the second case, where there is no smartwatch data but
there is an interaction with the keyboard. This means that
someone who is different from the logged-in user is using
the computer or the logged-in user’s smartwatch currently
can not provide data. In this case, WACA currently can not
differentiate if somebody else is using or the current user’s
smartwatch can not provide data. The security policy can be
adjusted to immediately logout even though it will decrease
the convenient of the user, but this is a rare case as it can only
occur if the battery dies or the smartwatch is broken.
Factors that may affect the performance. WACA is pri-
marily designed for the organizations or offices where the
passwords of the common computers may possibly be shared.
However, the deployment of WACA is not restricted to those
cases. It could also potentially be employed in applications
where remote access is needed (e.g., web-based applications).
The user may want to use WACA with his/her personal com-
puter, where the user carries the computer wherever s/he goes.
The high variation in the keyboard features like orientation,
sizes, and types, or the current mood or the age of the user or
the familiarity of the text may affect the efficiency of WACA.
Therefore, for this type of personal usages, calibration may be
needed by considering the trade-off between FAR and FRR. In
this kind of personal usage scenarios, since the threat vectors
will be more limited, the threshold can be extended to provide
a more usable system. We leave these as future work.
VIII. RELATED WORK
In the literature, a number of works have been proposed for
the use of biometrics in continuous user authentication [35],
[36], [37], [38], [39], [40], [41]. However, one of the desired
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features in the continuous authentication is transparency. Hard
biometrics like iris pattern or DNA are not applicable since
they can not be extracted transparently. In another work [42],
a special mouse with a fingerprint sensor is proposed. In
addition to requiring a custom mouse, its reliability is also
an issue. The ease of counterfeiting fingerprints was shown
and the fingerprint-based biometrics was easily bypassed [43],
[44]. Facial recognition methods may seem a good candi-
date; however, the liveliness detection is still an issue to
be addressed and several attacks are possible under practical
conditions [45], [46]. In addition, several other biometrics like
pulse-response [47] or eye movements [13] are also proposed.
However, since these approaches require special equipments,
deployment costs are increasing significantly.
Recent suspicions on keystroke dynamics. Among all the
biometrics, the most promising results are proposed using
keystroke dynamics and mouse movements [48], [16]. How-
ever, in a recent work [19], the reliability of classical keystroke
dynamics are analyzed and an interface, called Mimesis, was
designed so that a user can mimic the typing rhythm of another
user by using the feedback provided by Mimesis. In another
study [21], the statistical attacks with bots generating synthetic
typing patterns are examined for the conventional keystrokes
biometrics. In our work, we test WACA against both these
imitation and statistical attacks using similar configurations
presented in these papers. We show that WACA is secure
against the powerful imitation and statistical attacks with its
design. Particularly, using 6 dimensions independently makes
it harder to mimic and its high dimensional feature vector
makes it harder to defeat using forged data. The detailed
analysis of these attacks are given in Section V-B.
An inspirational work. The closest work to our approach is
proposed in [49] called ZEBRA. In ZEBRA, users are clas-
sified according to the sequence of interactions (e.g., typing,
scrolling), where the user wears a bracelet with motion sensors
and radio. ZEBRA has been shown as insecure in another
work [20]. Our work differs from ZEBRA in several ways.
For the details, please see the Appendix.
Comparative evaluation of WACA. In the literature, there is
not widely accepted standard framework to compare device au-
thenticators. However, Usability-Deployability-Security (UDS)
framework proposed in [50] is a highly accepted framework
for web authentication schemes. To compare our work with
its alternatives, we remove some of the irrelevant and non-
applicable benefits and use only the relevant ones of UDS
framework. The complete list of benefits can be found in [50].
After also adding three new benefits, we end up with 18
benefits in total. Table VI rates WACA using these 18 benefits.
For space, we cannot compare WACA to all continuous
authentication methods proposed in the literature. Therefore,
we choose representatives for each continuous authentication
method.
WACA captures the sensor readings through a smartwatch
without interrupting the user, i.e., unobtrusively. However,
unlike time-out or classical keystroke dynamics, it requires
an extra channel to collect data, but obviously a smartwatch
TABLE VI: Comparative evaluation of WACA using the UDS
framework [50] with continuous authentication alternatives.
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Usability Dep. Security
Password         
Time-out   G#      na   na na
Proximity [51], [52]  G# G# G# G#   G# G# na  
Face [53], [33]   G# G# G# G#  G#   G#    
Fingerprint [42]   G# G#  G#   G#    
Eye-movement [13]   G# G#           
Keystroke [54]   G# G#    G#     
ZEBRA [49]  G# G# G# G#   G#    G#   G#  
WACA (this work)  G# G# G# G#   G#           
 = offers the benefit; G# = almost offers the benefit; no circle = does not offer the benefit.
is a not a customized hardware, i.e., it is an off-the-shelf
device, so we say it partially supports the benefit of Nothing-to-
Carry and since its error is very low, it also offers the benefit
of Infrequent-Errors. On the other hand, WACA outperforms
all other methods in terms of security benefits. In addition
to WACA, eye-movement based authentication method also
seems as secure as WACA. However, WACA’s performance
for usability and deployability is better. For example, WACA
offers much lower error rates and eye-movement based meth-
ods require a special eye or gaze-trackers and the user should
be in a certain distance and in front of the eye tracker which
obstructs the usability of the eye-movement based methods.
They are more convenient for challenge-response type authen-
tication methods [55] even though they have the capability
to provide data continuously and transparently. In brief, our
conclusion from this comparative evaluation shows that WACA
offers better security benefits while keeping the usability at the
same level as other notable methods.
IX. CONCLUSION
Wearables such as smartwatches and fitness trackers carried
by individuals have grown exponentially in a short period of
time. It is estimated that one in four smartphone owners will
also be using a wearable device such as a smartwatch. This
ubiquity of wearable devices make them a perfect candidate
to utilize in continuous authentication settings. The continu-
ous authentication allows users to be re-verified periodically
throughout the login session without breaking the continuity
of the session. In this paper, we introduced a novel Wearable-
Assisted Continuous Authentication (WACA) utilizing the
sensory data from the built-in motion sensors available on
smartwatches. WACA is a practical and usable wearable-
assisted continuous authentication system that combines the
functionality of wearables and usability of continuous authen-
tication. Particularly, WACA decreases the vulnerable time
13
window of a continuous authentication system to as low as
20 seconds, prevents the privilege abuse and insider attacks
and also allows the insider threat identification. Moreover,
we evaluated the efficacy and robustness of WACA with real
data from real experiments. The results showed that WACA
could achieve 1% EER for 30 seconds or 2 − 3% EER
for 20 seconds of data collection time and error rates are
as low as 1% with almost a perfect (99.2%) insider threat
identification rate. Furthermore, WACA was tested and shown
as secure against different powerful adversaries (imitation and
statistical attacks) and achieved a minimal overhead on the
utilization of the system’s resources. As a future work, it
would be interesting to test WACA to deploy in authentication
settings combining keystroke dynamics from both keyboard
and smartwatch sensors.
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APPENDIX
In Table VII and VIII, we present the times to built the
model for MLP algorithm, which is used for the insider threat
detection in Section V.
TABLE VII: Scenario 1 in Section V.
Time taken to build the model (seconds)
Training Set
Sample size 1 2 3 4 5
1500 0.99 2.02 3 3.99 4.94
1000 1 1.99 2.98 3.95 4.94
500 0.98 2.02 3.01 3.98 4.95
250 1 1.95 2.93 3.92 4.95
In Algorithm 1, we present the pseudo-code of the attack
algorithm given in V-B2.
TABLE VIII: Scenario 2 in Section V.
Time taken to build the model (seconds)
Training Set
Sample size 1 2 3 4 5
1500 1 1.97 2.97 4.01 4.99
1000 1 1.99 2.95 4.04 4.93
500 0.99 2 2.98 3.98 4.98
250 0.99 1.96 3.02 3.96 4.96
Algorithm 1 Calculate EER for a statistical attacker.
Require: SamplesMXN []: M is # of samples and N is # of
features
Require: outNumber: # of generated forged samples
Require: binNumber: # of bins
Require: topBins: # of top bins used to generate forge
samples
Ensure: new eer: # new error rate against the attack
1: for each user do
2: victim← user;
3: victimSamples← getSamples(victim);
4: attackSamples← getSamples(∼ victim);
5: combin[] ← ComGen(N, outNumber, topBins);
6: for each forgeid si ∈ attackSamples do
7: for each feature fj ∈ attackSamples do
8: [freq, edges] ← histGen();
9: [∼,index] ← sortBins(freq);
10: index(topBins+ 1 : end)← [];
11: m← edges(index(combin[fj, forgeid]));
12: forgedSamples← random([m, m+ 1]);
13: end for
14: end for
15: victimSamples← addSamples(forgedSamples);
16: D ← calculateDissMatrix(TestingSamples);
17: eer for victim← calculateEER(D);
18: end for
19: new eer← mean(eer for victim);
20: return new eer
Serious design flaws has been detected. In ZEBRA, the
attacker has control on the data that authenticator components
receives. Therefore, an attacker can opportunistically choose a
subset of the sequences to imitate, instead of naı¨vely trying to
imitate every activity the user is doing. Although the idea of
using a wearable in continuous authentication settings seems
similar with ours, our design differs from ZEBRA in many
ways to tackle those flaws and strengthen our design. First
and most importantly, instead of sequence of interactions, we
use a variant of keystroke dynamics as an authentication factor,
which was extensively well-studied in the research literature
and shown as a unique behavioral biometric for each person
(see [56] for a very recent survey). Behavioral biometrics are
harder to imitate and the keystrokes are much shorter than the
interactions, which makes it harder to be imitated by a nearby
shoulder-surfing attacker. We also note that we tested WACA
against imitation attacks in Section V-B1. Moreover, we also
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use each axis of the sensor data to create another feature
while in ZEBRA, before using a sensor data, the magnitude
of each sensor’s data is calculated by the root mean square
formula. Each axis of the sensor data is independent from each
other. Therefore, an imitation attack [19] is possible only if
one can mimic another one’s typing behaviour in six different
dimensions. This increases the strength of WACA significantly
against imitation attacks. Not only these security measures,
WACA has some other minor design details that makes it
more usable. For example, while ZEBRA requires wearing
the bracelet on the hand that the mouse is controlled, WACA
does not have a limitation on which hand the smartwatch is
worn. Finally, since WACA utilizes a behavioral biometric, it
also allows insider threat identification, where ZEBRA is not
tested for this purpose.
16
